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Abstract
The Lovász extension of a pseudo-Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → R is deﬁned on each simplex of the standard triangulation of
[0, 1]n as the unique afﬁne function fˆ : [0, 1]n → R that interpolates f at the n + 1 vertices of the simplex. Its degree is that of the
unique multilinear polynomial that expresses f. In this paper we investigate the least squares approximation problem of an arbitrary
Lovász extension fˆ by Lovász extensions of (at most) a speciﬁed degree.We derive explicit expressions of these approximations. The
corresponding approximation problem for pseudo-Boolean functions was investigated by Hammer and Holzman [Approximations
of pseudo-Boolean functions; applications to game theory, Z. Oper. Res. 36(1) (1992) 3–21] and then solved explicitly by Grabisch
et al. [Equivalent representations of set functions, Math. Oper. Res. 25(2) (2000) 157–178], giving rise to an alternative deﬁnition
of Banzhaf interaction index. Similarly we introduce a new interaction index from approximations of fˆ and we present some of its
properties. It turns out that its corresponding power index identiﬁes with the power index introduced by Grabisch and Labreuche
[How to improve acts: an alternative representation of the importance of criteria in MCDM, Internat. J. Uncertain. Fuzziness
Knowledge-Based Syst. 9(2) (2001) 145–157].
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction and problem setting
Real valued set functions are extensively used in both cooperative game theory and multicriteria decision-making
(see for instance [11] and the references therein). Indeed, in its characteristic form, a cooperative game on a ﬁnite set
of players N := {1, . . . , n}, is a set function v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0 which assigns to each coalition S of
players a real number v(S) representing the worth of S. In multicriteria decision-making, when N represents a set of
criteria, a capacity (also called non-additive measure) on N is a monotone set function v : 2N → R such that v(∅)= 0
and v(N) = 1 which assigns to each subset S of criteria its weight v(S).
There is a natural identiﬁcation of real valued set functions v : 2N → R with pseudo-Boolean functions f :
{0, 1}n → R through the equality v(S) = f (1S), where 1S denotes the characteristic vector of S in {0, 1}n (whose ith
component is 1 if and only if i ∈ S). Moreover, it is known [15] that any pseudo-Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → R
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has a unique expression as a multilinear polynomial in n variables
f (x) =
∑
S⊆N
a(S)
∏
i∈S
xi , (1)
where the set function a : 2N → R is simply the Möbius transform (see for instance [21]) of v, which can be calculated
through
a(S) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T | v(T ). (2)
Let Sn denote the family of all permutations  on N. The Lovász extension fˆ : [0, 1]n → R of any pseudo-Boolean
function f is deﬁned on each n-simplex
S := {x ∈ [0, 1]n | x(1) · · · x(n)} ( ∈ Sn),
as the unique afﬁne function which interpolates f at the n + 1 vertices of S (see [17, Section 3; 24, Section 2]).
The concept of Lovász extension was initially used in combinatorial optimization [8,17,24] and then in cooperative
game theory [2,11]. In this paper we are mostly concerned by the interpretation of this concept in decision-making,
where it was observed in [18] that the Lovász extension of a monotone pseudo-Boolean function is nothing but a
discrete Choquet integral [4,5]. Recall that discrete Choquet integrals were recently proposed in decision-making as
aggregation functions that generalize the weighted arithmetic means by the taking into consideration of the interaction
phenomena among input variables; see for instance [12,19].
As pointed out in Grabisch et al. [11], the Lovász extension of any pseudo-Boolean function f can be expressed as
the following min-polynomial:
fˆ (x) =
∑
S⊆N
a(S) min
i∈S xi .
Its degree is that of the multilinear polynomial (1) that expresses f.
Hammer and Holzman [14] investigated the approximation of a pseudo-Boolean function f by a multilinear polyno-
mial of (at most) a speciﬁed degree. More precisely, ﬁxing k ∈ N, with kn, they deﬁned the best kth approximation
of f as the multilinear polynomial fk : {0, 1}n → R of degree at most k which minimizes∑
x∈{0,1}n
[f (x) − g(x)]2
among all multilinear polynomials g of degree at most k. They obtained an explicit form of the solution for k = 1 and
2. For a general k, the explicit form of the solution was obtained by Grabisch et al. [11, Section 7]. It is written as
fk(x) =
∑
S⊆N
|S| k
ak(S)
∏
i∈S
xi ,
where
ak(S) = a(S) + (−1)k+|S|
∑
T⊇S
|T |>k
( |T |−|S|−1
k−|S|
)
2|T |−|S|
a(T ). (3)
Hammer and Holzman [14] also noticed that a1({i}) identiﬁes with the classical Banzhaf power index [3] related to the
ith player. More generally, Grabisch et al. [11] noticed that, for any S ⊆ N , the coefﬁcient a|S|(S) identiﬁes with the
Banzhaf interaction index [22] related to the coalition S.
In this paper we investigate the least squares approximation of a given Lovász extension fˆ by a min-polynomial of
(at most) a speciﬁed degree. More precisely, ﬁxing k ∈ N, with kn, we give explicit formulas (see Section 2) for the
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best kth approximation of fˆ , that is, the min-polynomial fˆk : [0, 1]n → R of degree at most k which minimizes∫
[0,1]n
[fˆ (x) − gˆ(x)]2 dx
among all min-polynomials gˆ of degree at most k.
It is important to emphasize that this least squares problemhas a relevant application inmulticriteria decision-making.
Indeed, consider a multicriteria decision-making problem modeled by a Choquet integral and its underlying capacity on
a set of n criteria. It is sometimes useful to approximate this Choquet integral (which is, actually, the Lovász extension
of the capacity) by simpler aggregation functions such as Lovász extensions of degree k (k <n). Indeed this subclass
of functions includes the Choquet integrals constructed from k-order capacities introduced by Grabisch [9].
By analogy with the Banzhaf interaction index obtained from the approximations of f, we show (see Section 3)
that the approximations of fˆ give rise to a new interaction index having appealing properties (see for instance [7]).
Furthermore, it turns out that its corresponding power index identiﬁes with a power index introduced axiomatically by
Grabisch and Labreuche [10].
In order to avoid a heavy notation, cardinalities of subsets S, T , . . . are denoted whenever possible by the corre-
sponding lower case letters s, t, . . . , otherwise by the standard notation |S|, |T |, . . . . Also, for any S ⊆ N we deﬁne
the function minS : [0, 1]n → R as
minS(x) := min
i∈S xi ,
with the convention that min∅ ≡ 1. Finally, we denote byFN the family of set functions v : 2N → R.
2. Approximations of Lovász extensions
We ﬁrst recall the setting of our approximation problem. For any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we denote by Vk the set of all
min-polynomials fˆk : [0, 1]n → R of degree at most k, i.e., of the form
fˆk(x) =
∑
S⊆N
|S| k
ak(S) min
i∈S xi .
Deﬁnition 1. Let fˆ ∈ Vn and k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The best kth approximation of fˆ is the min-polynomial fˆk ∈ Vk that
minimizes∫
[0,1]n
[fˆ (x) − gˆ(x)]2 dx
among all min-polynomials gˆ of Vk .
In this section we ﬁrst discuss existence and uniqueness of the best kth approximation of any function fˆ ∈ Vn (see
Proposition 3). Then we provide a closed-form formula for this approximation (see Theorem 9).
We begin with the following straightforward proposition:
Proposition 2. For any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the set Vk is a linear subspace of Vn, which in turn is a linear subspace of the
space C0([0, 1]n) of continuous functions on [0, 1]n. Moreover, the set
Bk := {minS | S ⊆ N, sk} , (4)
forms a basis of Vk and hence dim(Vk) =∑ks=0 (ns ).
Consider the usual inner product 〈· , ·〉 of C0([0, 1]n) given by
〈f1, f2〉 :=
∫
[0,1]n
f1(x) f2(x) dx.
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This clearly induces an inner product in Vn, which in turn allows to deﬁne a norm ‖fˆ ‖ := 〈fˆ , fˆ 〉1/2 and then a
distance d(fˆ1, fˆ2) := ‖fˆ1 − fˆ2‖ in Vn.
According to this terminology, the best kth approximation of fˆ ∈ Vn is the solution fˆk of the following least squares
problem
min{‖fˆ − gˆ‖2 | gˆ ∈ Vk},
which amounts to a classical orthogonal projection problem.
From now on, for any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we denote by Ak the orthogonal projector from Vn onto Vk .
Proposition 3. For any fˆ ∈ Vn and any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the best kth approximation of fˆ exists and is uniquely given
by fˆk = Ak(fˆ ). In particular, it is characterized as the unique element fˆk of Vk such that fˆ − fˆk is orthogonal to Vk ,
i.e., to each element of the basis Bk deﬁned in (4).
This projection problem can be simpliﬁed because of the following result, which immediately follows from the fact
that the subspaces Vk are nested:
Proposition 4. The operators Ak , k = 0, . . . , n, are such that
kk′ ⇒ Ak(Ak′(fˆ )) = Ak(fˆ ). (5)
We thus observe thatAk(fˆ ) can be attained from fˆ by successively carrying out the projectionsAn−1, An−2, . . . , Ak .
We will therefore search for the relation that links any two consecutive projections. This relation will enable us to
compute gradually Ak(fˆ ) from fˆ .
Remark 5. Fix k ∈ {0, . . . , n−1} and assume that fˆk+1=Ak+1(fˆ ) is given. By (5),Ak(fˆ ) is the orthogonal projection
of Ak+1(fˆ ) onto Vk and by Proposition 3, it is given as the unique solution fˆk ∈ Vk of the following system:
〈
fˆk,minS
〉
=
〈
fˆk+1,minS
〉
(S ⊆ N, sk).
To solve this projection problem, we need the following two lemmas. The ﬁrst one yields an explicit expression of
the inner product 〈minS,minT 〉 of any two elements of Bn. The second lemma, which makes use of the ﬁrst one, yields
an explicit expression of the projections onto Vk of the elements of Bk+1\Bk .
Lemma 6. For any S, T ⊆ N , there holds
∫
[0,1]n
minS(x)minT (x) dx = 1|S ∪ T | + 2
(
1
s + 1 +
1
t + 1
)
. (6)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 7. For any S ⊆ N , with s = k + 1, we have
Ak (minS) =
∑
TS
(−1)k+t
(
k + t + 1
k + 1
)
(
2k + 2
k + 1
) minT .
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Proposition 8. Let k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. Given the coefﬁcients ak+1(S) of Ak+1(fˆ ), the coefﬁcients ak(S) of Ak(fˆ ) are
given by
ak(S) = ak+1(S) + (−1)k+s
(
k + s + 1
k + 1
)
(
2k + 2
k + 1
) ∑
T⊇S
t=k+1
ak+1(T ). (7)
Proof. Using formula (5) and then Lemma 7, we obtain
Ak(fˆ ) = Ak(Ak+1(fˆ )) =
∑
S⊆N
s k+1
ak+1(S)Ak (minS)
=
∑
S⊆N
s k
ak+1(S)minS +
∑
S⊆N
s=k+1
ak+1(S)Ak (minS)
=
∑
S⊆N
s k
ak+1(S)minS +
∑
S⊆N
s=k+1
ak+1(S)
∑
TS
(−1)k+t
(
k + t + 1
k + 1
)
(
2k + 2
k + 1
) minT ,
which proves the result. 
We are now ready to derive the explicit form of the coefﬁcients of Ak(fˆ ) in terms of the coefﬁcients of fˆ . It is worth
comparing this formula with the solution (3) of the Hammer–Holzman approximation problem.
Theorem 9. Let k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The coefﬁcients of Ak(fˆ ) are given from those of fˆ by
ak(S) = a(S) + (−1)k+s
∑
T⊇S
t>k
(
k + s + 1
k + 1
)(
t − s − 1
k − s
)
(
k + t + 1
k + 1
) a(T ). (8)
Proof. We only have to prove that the coefﬁcients ak(S) given in (8) fulﬁll the recurrence relation (7).
Let k ∈ {0, . . . , n} and ﬁx S ⊆ N with sk. By substituting (8) into (7), we obtain, after removing the common
term a(S),
(−1)k+s
∑
R⊇S
r>k
(
k + s + 1
k + 1
)(
r − s − 1
k − s
)
(
k + r + 1
k + 1
) a(R)
= (−1)k+s+1
∑
R⊇S
r>k+1
(
k + s + 2
k + 2
)(
r − s − 1
k − s + 1
)
(
k + r + 2
k + 2
) a(R)
+ (−1)k+s
(
k + s + 1
k + 1
)
(
2k + 2
k + 1
) ∑
T⊇S
t=k+1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣a(T ) + ∑
R⊇T
r>k+1
(
2k + 3
k + 2
)
(
k + r + 2
k + 2
)a(R)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
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Let us show that this equality holds. Dividing through by (−1)k+s and then removing the terms corresponding to a(R),
with r = k + 1, the equality becomes
∑
R⊇S
r>k+1
(
k + s + 1
k + 1
)(
r − s − 1
k − s
)
(
k + r + 1
k + 1
) a(R)
= −
∑
R⊇S
r>k+1
(
k + s + 2
k + 2
)(
r − s − 1
k − s + 1
)
(
k + r + 2
k + 2
) a(R) + ∑
R⊇S
r>k+1
(
k + s + 1
k + 1
)(
2k + 3
k + 2
)(
r − s
k − s + 1
)
(
2k + 2
k + 1
)(
k + r + 2
k + 2
) a(R).
Fix R ⊇ S, with r > k + 1, and consider the coefﬁcients of a(R) in the previous equality. By equating them, we obtain
an identity which can be easily checked. 
Example 10. Let fˆ : [0, 1]4 → R be given by
fˆ (x) = 310 (x1 + x2 + x3 + min{x1, x2} + min{x1, x3} + min{x2, x3})
− 2125 min{x1, x2, x3} + 125 min{x1, x2, x3, x4}.
The best constant approximation is given by
(A0fˆ )(x) = 137250 ,
the best linear approximation by
(A1fˆ )(x) = 1100 + 89250 (x1 + x2 + x3) + 1125x4
and the best min-quadratic approximation by
(A2fˆ )(x) = − 27700 + 8031750 (x1 + x2 + x3) − 8875x4 − 19175 (min{x1, x2} + min{x1, x3} + min{x2, x3})
+ 2175 (min{x1, x4} + min{x2, x4} + min{x3, x4}).
Before closing this section, we show that every approximation preserves the symmetry properties of the functions.
For instance, in the previous example, we observe that the function fˆ and all its approximations are symmetric in the
variables x1, x2, and x3.
Let us establish this result in a more general setting. Let X be a non-empty closed convex set in a ﬁnite-dimensional
inner product space V. For any u ∈ V , the distance between u and X is achieved at a unique point in X. We denote this
point by AX(u) and call it the projection of u onto X (see for instance [16, Chapter 3, Section 3.1]).
Lemma 11. Let I : V → V be an isometry such that I (X) = X. Then I and AX commute, i.e., I ◦ AX = AX ◦ I .
Proof. We clearly have I [AX(u)] ∈ X for any u ∈ V . Furthermore, for any v ∈ X, we have
‖I (u) − I [AX(u)]‖ = ‖u − AX(u)‖‖u − v‖ = ‖I (u) − I (v)‖,
which shows that I [AX(u)] is the projection of I (u) onto X. 
Let us now apply this result to our least squares approximation problem.
Deﬁnition 12. For any  in Sn, we deﬁne the linear operator P of Vn as
Pfˆ (x1, . . . , xn) := fˆ (x(1), . . . , x(n)).
We say that  ∈ Sn is a symmetry of fˆ if P(fˆ ) = fˆ .
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Proposition 13. For any  ∈ Sn, the operator P is an isometry of Vn such that P(Vk) = Vk . In particular, the
operators P and Ak commute and Ak preserves the symmetries of its arguments.
Proof. It is clear that P(Vk) = Vk and that P is an isometry, i.e., it satisﬁes
〈Pfˆ , Pgˆ〉 = 〈fˆ , gˆ〉 (fˆ , gˆ ∈ Vn).
Therefore, by Lemma 11, P and Ak commute. In particular, if  ∈ Sn is a symmetry of fˆ , then
P[Ak(fˆ )] = Ak[P(fˆ )] = Ak(fˆ )
and hence  is also a symmetry of Ak(fˆ ). 
3. A new interaction index
In cooperative game theory the concept of power index (or value) was introduced in the pioneering work of Shapley
[23]. Roughly speaking, a power index on N is a function  : FN × N → R that assigns to every player i ∈ N in a
game v ∈FN his/her prospect (v, i) from playing the game. The Shapley power index of a player i ∈ N in a game
v ∈FN is given by
Sh(v, i) :=
∑
T⊆N\{i}
1
n
(
n − 1
t
)−1
[v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T )].
Another frequently used power index is the Banzhaf power index [3,6] which, for a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ FN ,
is deﬁned by
B(v, i) :=
∑
T⊆N\{i}
1
2n−1
[v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T )].
The concept of interaction index, which is an extension of that of power index, was recently introduced axiomatically to
measure the interaction phenomena amongplayers.An interaction indexonN is essentially a function I :FN×2N → R
that assigns to every coalition S ⊆ N of players in a game v ∈FN its interaction degree. Various interaction indices
have been introduced thus far in the literature: the Shapley interaction index [9], the Banzhaf interaction index [13,22],
and the chaining interaction index [20], which all belong to the class of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices (see
Deﬁnition 14 below) newly axiomatized in [7].
For instance, the Banzhaf interaction index on N, which extends the concept of Banzhaf power index on N, is the
mapping IB :FN × 2N → R deﬁned by
IB(v, S) :=
∑
T⊆N\S
1
2n−s
Sv(T ),
where Sv(T ) is the S-derivative of v at T deﬁned for any disjoint subsets S, T ⊆ N by
Sv(T ) :=
∑
R⊆S
(−1)s−r v(R ∪ T ). (9)
This index can be easily expressed in terms of the Möbius transform (2) of v as
IB(v, S) =
∑
T⊇S
1
2t−s
a(T ).
It is noteworthy that, besides the axiomatic approach presented in [13,22], the Banzhaf interaction index can also be
deﬁned from theHammer–Holzman approximation problem. Indeed, as pointed out in [14;11, Section 7], by considering
the leading coefﬁcients in (3) of the best sth approximation, for all s = 0, . . . , n, we immediately observe that
IB(v, S) = as(S).
18 J.-L. Marichal, P. Mathonet / Discrete Applied Mathematics 156 (2008) 11–24
In this section we use the same approach to deﬁne a new interaction index from our approximation problem of Lovász
extensions. In this sense this new index can be seen as an analog of the Banzhaf interaction index.
Before going on, we recall the concept of cardinal-probabilistic interaction index [7].
Deﬁnition 14. A cardinal-probabilistic interaction index on N is a mapping Ip : FN × 2N → R such that, for any
S ⊆ N , there is a family of non-negative real numbers {pst (n)}t=0,...,n−s satisfying
∑n−s
t=0pst (n) = 1, such that
Ip(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pst (n)Sv(T ). (10)
It has been proved [7, Section 4] that a mapping Ip : FN × 2N → R of form (10) is a cardinal-probabilistic
interaction index on N if and only if, for any integer s ∈ {0, . . . , n}, there exists a uniquely determined cumulative
distribution function Fs on [0, 1] such that
pst (n) =
∫ 1
0
xt (1 − x)n−s−t dFs(x). (11)
Moreover, deﬁning qst := pst−s(t) =
∫ 1
0 x
t−s dFs(x) for all integers s, t such that 0s tn, we have
Ip(v, S) =
∑
T⊇S
qst a(T ). (12)
The following lemma provides conditions on arbitrary coefﬁcients qst so that a mapping of form (12) can be a cardinal-
probabilistic interaction index.
Lemma 15. Consider an inﬁnite sequence {qst }t s0. Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) we have∑mi=0(−1)i (mi ) qst+i0 for all m0 and all ts0,(ii) there is a unique cumulative distribution function Fs on [0, 1] such that, for any integer ts0,
qst =
∫ 1
0
xt−s dFs(x),
(iii) for any N = {1, . . . , n}, the function Ip : FN × 2N → R, deﬁned in (12) is a cardinal-probabilistic interaction
index.
Moreover, when these conditions are satisﬁed, then the mapping Ip :FN × 2N → R, deﬁned in (12), is of form (10)
and the coefﬁcients qst and pst (n) are linked through qst = pst−s(t) and
pst (n) =
n∑
i=s+t
(−1)i−s−t
(
n − s − t
i − s − t
)
qsi .
Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii) Follows immediately from the Hausdorff’s moment problem (see for instance [1, Theorem 2.6.4]).
(ii) ⇒ (iii) Rewriting (12) in terms of v gives
Ip(v, S) =
∑
J⊇S
qsj
∑
L⊆J
(−1)j−lv(L).
Partitioning L ⊆ J into R ⊆ S and T ⊆ J\S and then using (9), we obtain
Ip(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
⎡
⎣ ∑
J⊇S∪T
(−1)j−s−t qsj
⎤
⎦∑
R⊆S
(−1)s−rv(R ∪ T )
=
∑
T⊆N\S
pst (n)Sv(T ),
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where the coefﬁcients pst (n) are given by
pst (n) =
n∑
j=s+t
(−1)j−s−t
(
n − s − t
j − s − t
)
qsj =
∫ 1
0
xt (1 − x)n−s−t dFs(x),
which shows that Ip is a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index.
(iii) ⇒ (ii) According to formula (12), we have
Ip(v, S) =
∑
T⊇S
qst a(T ) =
∑
T⊇S
[∫ 1
0
xt−s dFs(x)
]
a(T ),
which completes the proof by uniqueness of this decomposition. 
We are now ready to introduce our new interaction index, namely the mapping
IM :FN × 2N → R : (v, S) → IM(v, S) = as(S),
where as(S) are the leading coefﬁcients in (8) of the best sth approximation of fˆ , for all s = 0, . . . , n.
This immediately leads to the following equivalent deﬁnition, which makes use of the classical beta function
B(a, b) :=
∫ 1
0
ua−1(1 − u)b−1 du (a, b > 0).
Deﬁnition 16. For any N = {1, . . . , n}, we deﬁne the mapping IM :FN × 2N → R as
IM(v, S) =
∑
T⊇S
qst a(T ),
where qst :=
(
2s+1
s+1
)
(
s+t+1
s+1
) = B(t+1,s+1)
B(s+1,s+1) for all ts0.
By using Lemma 15, we can easily show that IM is a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index.
Proposition 17. The function IM :FN × 2N → R is a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index, given by
IM(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pst (n)Sv(T ),
where pst (n) := B(n−t+1,s+t+1)B(s+1,s+1) .
Proof. We immediately observe that Lemma 15 applies with the beta distribution
Fs(x) =
∫ x
0 u
s(1 − u)s du
B(s + 1, s + 1) .
Indeed, we have∫ 1
0
xt−s dFs(x) = 1
B(s + 1, s + 1)
∫ 1
0
xt (1 − x)s dx = qst .
The expression of the coefﬁcients pst (n) then follows immediately from (11). 
The following proposition shows that the mapping v → (IM(v, S))S⊆N is invertible and yields the transformation
formula from (IM(v, S))S⊆N to a = (a(S))S⊆N .
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Proposition 18. For any S ⊆ N , we have
a(S) =
∑
T⊇S
hst IM(v, T ),
with
hst = (−1)t−s
(
s + t
t
)
(
2t
t
) .
Proof. We only need to show that∑
T⊇S
qst
∑
R⊇T
htr IM(v, R) = IM(v, S).
We have∑
T⊇S
qst
∑
R⊇T
htr IM(v, R) =
∑
R⊇S
IM(v, R)
∑
T :S⊆T⊆R
qst h
t
r ,
where the inner sum equals 1 if S = R and 0 if SR. Indeed, in the latter case, we have
∑
T :S⊆T⊆R
qst h
t
r =
(
2s + 1
s + 1
)
(
2r
r
) (s + 1)!
r!
r∑
t=s
(−1)r−t
(
r − s
t − s
)
(r + t)!
(s + t + 1)!
=
(
2s + 1
s + 1
)
(
2r
r
) (s + 1)!
r!
r∑
t=s
(−1)r−t
(
r − s
t − s
)[
dr−s−1
dxr−s−1
xr+t
]
x=1
=
(
2s + 1
s + 1
)
(
2r
r
) (s + 1)!
r!
[
dr−s−1
dxr−s−1
xr+s(x − 1)r−s
]
x=1
= 0. 
In order to conclude, we focus on the power index associated to IM . The following corollary shows that, incidentally,
this power index identiﬁes with the index Wi(fˆ ) previously introduced axiomatically by Grabisch and Labreuche [10,
Theorem 2] in the context of multicriteria decision-making.
Corollary 19. The restriction of IM(v, ·) to singletons is given by
IM(v, {i}) =
∑
T⊆N\{i}
6(n − t)!(t + 1)!
(n + 2)! [v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T )].
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 6
Observe ﬁrst that we can assume that S andT are such that |S∪T |=n. Moreover, suppose that S andT are non-empty.
Remark that [0, 1]n is equal almost everywhere to the disjoint union of the sets
S◦ := {x ∈ [0, 1]n | x(1) < · · ·<x(n)} ( ∈ Sn).
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Then we have
∫
[0,1]n
minS(x)minT (x) dx =
∑
∈Sn
I, (13)
where
I :=
∫
S◦
minS(x)minT (x) dx ( ∈ Sn).
Now, deﬁne for every R ⊆ N and p ∈ {1, . . . , |R|} the set
S(p)n (R) := { ∈ Sn | (1), . . . , (p) ∈ R, (p + 1) /∈R}.
It is then clear that there is a decomposition of Sn into disjoint subsets
Sn = [Sn(S ∩ T )] ∪
⎡
⎣n−t⋃
p=1
S(p)n (S\T )
⎤
⎦ ∪
⎡
⎣n−s⋃
p=1
S(p)n (T \S)
⎤
⎦ , (14)
where
Sn(S ∩ T ) := { ∈ Sn | (1) ∈ S ∩ T }.
Moreover we have
{ |Sn(S ∩ T )| = |S ∩ T |(n − 1)!
|S(p)n (S\T )| =
(
n − t
p
)
p!t (n − p − 1)!
Indeed, every element of Sn(S ∩ T ) corresponds to a choice of (1) in S ∩ T , and a permutation of the remaining
elements in N. In the same fashion, every element of S(p)n (S\T ) is determined by the choice of p elements in S\T ,
a permutation of these elements, the choice of a single element in T and a permutation of the remaining elements.
Moreover, for any  ∈ Sn(S ∩ T ), we have
I =
∫ 1
0
∫ x(n)
0
· · ·
∫ x(2)
0
x2(1)dx(1) · · · dx(n) =
2
(n + 2)! ,
and
∑
∈Sn(S∩T )
I = 2|S ∩ T |(n − 1)!
(n + 2)! =
2(s + t − n)
n(n + 1)(n + 2) . (15)
In the same way, for any  ∈ S(p)n (S\T ), we have
I =
∫ 1
0
∫ x(n)
0
· · ·
∫ x(p+2)
0
x(p+1)
∫ x(p+1)
0
· · ·
∫ x(2)
0
x(1) dx(1) · · · dx(n)
= p + 2
(n + 2)! ,
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and
n−t∑
p=1
∑
∈S(p)n (S\T )
I = t
(n + 2)!
n−t∑
p=1
(
n − t
p
)
p!(n − p − 1)!(p + 2)
= t !(n − t)!
(n + 2)!
n−t∑
p=1
(
n − p − 1
t − 1
)
(p + 2)
= t !(n − t)!
(n + 2)!
⎡
⎣(n + 2) n−t∑
p=1
(
n − p − 1
t − 1
)
− t
n−t∑
p=1
(
n − p
t
)⎤⎦
= t !(n − t)!
(n + 2)!
[
(n + 2)
(
n − 1
t
)
− t
(
n
t + 1
)]
,
that is,
n−t∑
p=1
∑
∈S(p)n (S\T )
I = (n − t)(n + 2t + 2)
n(n + 1)(n + 2)(t + 1) . (16)
Similarly, we can write
n−s∑
p=1
∑
∈S(p)n (T \S)
I = (n − s)(n + 2s + 2)
n(n + 1)(n + 2)(s + 1) (17)
and by Eqs. (13)–(17), we have
∫
[0,1]n
minS(x) minT (x) dx =
∑
∈Sn(S∩T )
I +
n−t∑
p=1
∑
∈S(p)n (S\T )
I +
n−s∑
p=1
∑
∈S(p)n (T \S)
I
= s + t + 2
(n + 2)(s + 1)(t + 1)
as desired. We can easily see that the result still holds if S = ∅ or T = ∅.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 7
We only have to prove that the explicit expression we give for Ak(minS) fulﬁlls the conditions of Proposition 3,
namely,
〈minS − Ak (minS) ,minT 〉 = 0 (T ⊆ N, tk),
or, equivalently,
∑
J⊆S
IJ,T (−1)k+j
(
k + j + 1
k + 1
)
= 0 (T ⊆ N, tk), (18)
where IJ,T := 〈minJ ,minT 〉 is given explicitly in (6).
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Partitioning J ⊆ S into P ⊆ S\T and Q ⊆ R with R := S ∩ T (hence r tk), the left-hand side of (18) becomes
∑
P⊆S\T
∑
Q⊆R
IP∪Q,T (−1)k+p+q
(
k + p + q + 1
k + 1
)
=
k−r+1∑
p=0
(
k − r + 1
p
) r∑
q=0
(
r
q
)
p + q + t + 2
(p + t + 2)(p + q + 1)(t + 1) (−1)
k+p+q
(
k + p + q + 1
k + 1
)
= −
k−r+1∑
p=0
(
k − r + 1
p
)
(−1)k−r+1−p 1
p + t + 2
r∑
q=0
(
r
q
)
(−1)r−qg(p + q),
where g : N → R is deﬁned by
g(z) = z + t + 2
(z + 1)(t + 1)
(
z + k + 1
k + 1
)
= 1
k + 1
(
z + k + 1
k
)
+ 1
t + 1
(
z + k + 1
k + 1
)
.
Consider the difference operator
n f (n) := f (n + 1) − f (n)
for functions on N. It is well known that we have
kn f (n) =
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
(−1)k−j f (n + j) (k ∈ N). (19)
Applying this to g, we obtain
r∑
q=0
(
r
q
)
(−1)r−q g(p + q) = rp g(p) =
1
k + 1
(
p + k + 1
k − r
)
+ 1
t + 1
(
p + k + 1
k − r + 1
)
and the left-hand side of (18) becomes
−
k−r+1∑
p=0
(
k − r + 1
p
)
(−1)k−r+1−p 1
p + t + 2
(
1
k + 1
(
p + k + 1
k − r
)
+ 1
t + 1
(
p + k + 1
k − r + 1
))
.
Applying (19) again, we see that this latter expression can be written as
−
[
k−r+1z
1
z + t + 2
(
1
k + 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r
)
+ 1
t + 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r + 1
))]
z=0
.
We now show that the expression in brackets is identically zero. We do this by considering two cases:
• If t = k then
1
z + t + 2
(
1
k + 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r
)
+ 1
t + 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r + 1
))
= 1
(k + 1)(z + k + 2)
(
z + k + 2
k − r + 1
)
= 1
(k + 1)(k − r + 1)
(
z + k + 1
k − r
)
is a polynomial Pk−r (z) of degree k − r , and k−r+1z Pk−r (z) ≡ 0.
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• If r tk − 1 then
1
z + t + 2
(
1
k + 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r
)
+ 1
t + 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r + 1
))
= 1
z + t + 2
(
1
(k + 1)(k − r)!
k+1∏
i=r+2
(z + i) + 1
(t + 1)(k − r + 1)!
k+1∏
i=r+1
(z + i)
)
is a polynomial Qk−r (z) of degree k − r , and k−r+1z Qk−r (z) ≡ 0.
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